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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
The appellants, Anastacio Gallegos and Juan Rel-
lis Gallegos, appeal from a decision of the Third Judi-
cial District Court denying their release upon Petition 
for \V rit of Habeas Corpus. 
DISPOSITION IN LO"\VER COURT 
On April 20, 1965, Anastacio and Juan Rellis 
Gallegos filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 
I 
in the District Court for Salt Lake County attacking 
their conviction for the crime of Second Degree Mur-
der. An answer to the petition was filed by the State on 
the 12th day of May, 1965, and on June 4, 1965, the 
matter came on for hearing before the Honorable 
Joseph Jeppson, Judge, who dismissed the petition, 
finding it without merit. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits the decision of the trial 
court denying relief by habeas corpus should be af-
firmed. 
STATE:MENT OF FACTS 
The respondent submits the following statement of 
facts. The appellants filed a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus, alleging that the prosecution knowingly used 
perjured testimony and that the jury failed to follow 
the court's instructions that no inference of guilt should 
be drawn from the mere fact that appellants failed 
to testify in their own behalf (R. 2). An answer to 
the petition was filed denying the allegations ( R. 9) . 
At the time of hearing, two witnesses were called on 
behalf of the appellants, both of them testifying on 
the issue of whether the jury followed the court's in-
structions relating to the failure of the appellants to 
testify in their own behalf (R. 24 through 27, 29 
through 31). Both jurors testified that they did follow 
2 
the court's instructions and drew no inference of the 
appellants' guilt from the fact that they failed to testify 
but, as a result of the appellants' failure to testify, 
the evidence against them was unrebutted, which caused. 
them to return a verdict of guilty. 
The appellants before this court have rajsed IH, 
issue relating to the question presented in the tr;al 
court as to whether the jury properly follmved th2 
court's instructions relating to the failure of the a11F:-
lants to testify in their own behalf. 
The only issue remaining on appeal is the question 
of whether the prosecution knowingly used perjureJ 
testimony. (See Appellant's Brief.) The transcript 
of trial was received in the trial court as was the tran-
script of the preliminary hearing had at the time of 
appellants' original trial (R. 33). The nature of the 
daim of alleged knowing use of perjured evidence by 
the prosecution does not clearly appear of record. Ap-
pellants' counsel below alleged that there were incon-
sistencies between the testimony of the principal State's 
witnesses at the time of preliminary hearing and at the 
time of trial ( R. 34) . No evidence was offered to show 
that the testimony given by the principal State's wit-
ness, _Mike Hoopiiana, was in fact false or false in any 
material aspect. Appellants' counsel below made a 
proffer as to the prosecution's knowledge, claiming that 
the district attorney would have been familiar with the 
preliminary hearing transcript and, consequently, would 
have been aware of any deviation in the testimony of 
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the State's witnesses from what appeared at the time 
of the preliminary hearing. Based upon that record, the 
trial court found no knowing use of perjured testimony 
and dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE RECORD IS VOID OF ANY EVI-
DENCE SHOWING A KNOWING USE OF 
PERJURED TESTIMONY. 
The trial court had before it the transcript of the 
preliminary hearing and the h'anscript of the original 
trial of the appellants. These records are not part of 
the record on appeal in the instant case. Consequently, 
the trial court was better able to determine whether the 
claimed inconsistent statements actually warranted 
relief by habeas corpus. The facts that appear in the 
instant record are only that there was a variance in the 
testimony of one witness from the time of the prelimi-
nary hearing and the time of trial. This court has pre-
viously reviewed the record in this case and found the 
evidence sufficient as against the alleged claims for 
reversal on appeal. State v. Gallegos, 16 U.2d 102, 
896 P.2d 414 (1964). 
Nowhere in the record does it appear that the evi-
dence actually given at the time of trial was in fact 
false. In 70 C.J.S., Perjury, Section 46, it is stated: 
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. "It has been held or stated that where perjury 
is based on contradictory oaths it is essential to 
show which is true and which is false." 
In State v. Lowe, 60 Ida. 98, 88 P.2d 502 (1939), the 
Idaho Supreme Court, Chief Justice Ailshie concur-
ring, noted: 
"It has been stated by very high authority 
that: 'If the pleader sets out contradictory oaths, 
it is also essential to show which is true and which 
is false.' Hilliard v. United States, 5 Cir., 24 
F .2d 99, 100; 3 Bishop, New Cr. Proc., sec. 
918." 
Generally, proof of falsity of an item testified to is 
essential to show that a statement given was perjured. 
State v. Anderson, 35 Utah 496, IOI Pac. 385 (1909). 
Nor does every statement which is inconsistent or par-
tially false constitute perjury. In Marra v. People, 
135 Colo. 458, 312 P.2d 505 ( 1957), the court note<l 
that the elements of perjury to be proven are falsity 
of the statement, its materiality to the issue, and the 
admission of the oath. The record in the instant case 
is materially deficient in showing that there was any 
perjury. The record does not disclose wherein the al-
leged testimony was false nor show that it was material 
rather than an insubstantial variance in the testimony. 
This court observed in State v. Hawkins, 81 Utah 
16, 16 P.2d 713 (1932), that evidence merely incon-
sistent with previous evidence would not justify a new 
trial. See also Jeter v. Common'tvealth, 268 Ky. 285, 
104 S.W.2d 979; 24 C.J.S., Criminal Law, Sec. 1460. 
5 
In JVard v. 'J"urner, 12 U.2d 310, 366 P.2d 72 ( HHil), 
this court reYersed release on habeas corpus on '.lk 
basis of knowing use of perjured testimony in a ca-;r_: 
substantially stronger than the instant case. This court 
observed: 
" * * * In order to justify a release of a con-
victed person under a writ of habeas corpus or 
coram nobis, or other special writ, the evidence 
of his innocence must be stronger than would be 
necessary in the first instance in support of a 
motion for a new trial, for such special writs are 
applied for after the defendant's conviction has 
been affirmed or denied on appeal, and in a sense 
they invade the usual rules for the finality of 
judgments.'' 
Additionally, it should be noted that there is no~ 
one scrap of evidenice in the record to show that UK 
prosecuting attorney had knowledge of the falsity ,:~ 
fact of any part of the alleged inconsistent testimony. 
This is an essential to the appellants' case. Furthc:,. 
since the instant case was a homicide case and a 'cran-
script of the testimony given at preliminary hem<;~'"; 
was available to the defendants (Section 77-15-14, Uta;1 
Code Annotated, 1953), the appellants, through tbc:ir 
counsel, had full opportunity to point out to the j m; 
any alleged inconsistency. At the time of trial, the 
appellants' counsel did in fact point out a variaD<:e 
between an unsworn statement given by the princ:;)al 
witness to the police and a subsequent testimony at :he 
time of trial. (See Case No. 10109, Brief of Respond-
ent, pages 4 through 6.) Certainly, under these circum-
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stances, there is no basis for extraordinary relief at 
this time. 
In order to justify release on habeas corpus, it 
must be shown by clear and convincing evidence that 
there was the knowing, wilful, and intentional use of 
perjured testimony for the purposes of securing a con-
viction. Butt v. Graham, 6 U.2d 133, 307 P.2d 892 
( 1957) ; Story v. Burford, 78 F.2d 911 (10th Cir. 
1949) ; Ex Parte Mooney, 10 Cal.2d I, 73 P.2d 195.5 
(1936); Mooney v. Halohan ,294 U.S. 103 (1935); 
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Alcorta v. 
Texas, 355 U.S. 28 ( 1957) ; 60 Columbia Law Review 
858; 5 Utah Law Review 92. This has not been shown. 
The appellants' contention that somehow the pro-
ceedings below did not afford them a fair forum in 
which to present their petition is equally without merit. 
Appellants' counsel called witnesses who testified to 
appellants' theory of the case. The fact that the court 
did not allow a continuance to obtain the testimony of 
the district attorney is meritless since the court con-
sidered the appellants' proffer of proof as being a fact 
and found it wanting. Further, the question of a con-
tinuance rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. 
State v. Mathis, 7 U.2d 100, 319 P.2d 134 (1957). 
Under the circumstances of this case, it is apparent 
that it cannot be said that there is any merit for the 




The appellants were given a full and fair trial 
at the time of the original charges in the instant case, 
afforded appellate review and an opportunity to present 
in an extraordinary proceeding evidence which would 
justify a determination of their innocence, the grant-
ing of a new trial, or relief by habeas corpus. In each 
instance, they have failed. In the instant appeal, it 
is patently obvious that the appellants' claim is wholly 
unmeritorious. 
Rsepectfully submitted, 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
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